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SEPARATE REVIEW OF CLAIMS IN MULTIPLE CLAIMS SUITS:
APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER AMENDED
FEDERAL RULE 54(b)*
APPELLATE jurisdiction in the federal courts is normally limited by statute
to the review of final decisions.1 In its historic form the final decision rule
meant that appeal could be taken only from a decision settling all issues as to
all parties.2 But when multiple claims are involved in one suit, trial con-
* Bendb= Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1932) ; Flegenheimer v. General
Mills, 191 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1951).
1. The latest revision of the Judicial Code provides: "The courts of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts... ." 23 U.S.C. § 1291
(Supp. 1952). The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over state decisions is likevwize
governed by the final decision rule. 23 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. 1952). For an historical
analysis and criticism of the final decision rule, see Crick, The Final Judgmnent as a Basis
of Appeal, 41 YA. E L.J. 539 (1932).
No satisfactory definition of a final decision can be found. Courts often have -aid
that finality involves the termination of the litigation so that nothing remains but to
execute the judgment. See. e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 133 (1945). For
an extensive list of various orders held to be final or not final, see 1 OLnx-,ax, Fzixi.
PRscricE 534-44 (1949).
Orders which are not final are termed interlocutory orders and are usually not appeal-
able. But statutory exceptions have been created for orders (1) granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunc-
tions; (2) appointing receivers, or refusing to wind up receiverships; (3) determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals from final
decrees are allowed; (4) settling rights in civil actions for patent infringeenvt which
are complete except for accounting. 2S U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp. 1952). The purpoe of this
section is said to be "to allow appeals from orders other than final judgments when they
have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties." Mr. Justice Jackson in
Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). Other opinions stress the
unnecessary delay and expense which might result from inability to appeal orders
covered by § 1292. See Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897) (decree
granting injunction); Russell Box Co. v. Grant Paper Box Co., 179 F.2d 7S5, 787 (1st
Cir. 1950) (patent infringement) ; Stark v. Texas Co., 83 F2d 182, 183 (5th Cir. 1937)
(admiralty).
The courts of appeals also have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory app-eals in bank-
ruptcy under Title 11 of the U.S. Code. And, in addition, the prerogative writs may t-
used in certain cases to review interlocutory orders. Note, SS Y, Ln UJ. 1186, 1183 (1949);
Crick, supra, at 554-7.
For judicially-created exceptions, see note 36 infra.
2. United States v. Girault, 11 How. 21, 32 (U.S. 1850); Holcombe v. McKusicl:, 20
How. 552, 554 (U.S. 1857); Lovmumm, APPELLAtT JtumsDIcTrOi 144 (1911). Ci. Collins
v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920.)
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venience may lead to separate disposition of parties and claims.8 And delay
in obtaining review of such a disposition may cause litigants unnecessary hard-
ship.4 In recognition of this problem, courts for many years have held in
some cases that certain claims were sufficiently separable from the rest of the
litigation to support independent appeal. And with the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting joinder in one suit of multiple
parties and claims which formerly would have required independent actions,0
a more flexible concept of finality became imperative. 7 So Rule 54(b) was
drafted providing that "when more than one claim for relief [was] presented
in an action," a district judge could enter a separate judgment "upon a de-
termination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which [was] the subject matter
of the claim. . .. "s
In an attempt to reconcile the "separate judgment" of Rule 54(b) with the
statutory requirement of finality, the Supreme Court held in Rezes v.
Beardall9 that judgments disposing of claims arising out of "wholly separate
and distinct transactions" were separately appealable.10 But lower courts had
3. FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b) provides: "The court in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-clahnm,
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues."
4. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
5. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926) (decree disposing
of claims of several parties in a condemnation action although a new trial was ordered as
to one party on a distinct claim); Hill v. Chicago & Evanston R.R., 140 U.S. 52 (1891)
(decree dismissing as to several parties although the amount of one item was referred to
a master) ; William v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684 (1884) (decree fixing compensation to be
paid to trustees under a mortgage in a foreclosure action).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (joinder
of third parties) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 18 (joinder of claims and remedies) ; Fw. R. Civ. P.
20 (permissive joinder of parties). For an extensive treatment of the practice in law
and equity prior to the Federal Rules, see DomiE, FEDERAL JuIusDIcTioN AND PROC=DUa
579-783 (1928).
7. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) ; 3 MooaE, FEDmuaAL
PRACcE 3156 (1st ed. 1938).
8. 308 U.S. 732 (1939) (Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 70).
9. 316 U.S. 283 (1942). Plaintiff brought three claims in a single action: (1) on a
promissory note executed by respondent's decedent; (2) on a contract between plaintiff
and respondent's decedent, whereby the latter agreed not to change her will in return for
certain securities and plaintiff's forebearance on the note; (3) for an accounting against
a third party who was alleged to hold assets of the respondent's decedent. Reversing the
holding of the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that, although the
other claims had been left pending, a dismissal of the second claim was immediately
appealable.
10. "The Rules make it clear that it is 'differing transactions or occurrences, which
form the basis of separate units of judicial action'" Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283,
285 (1942), quoting Judge Clark in Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., 111 F.2d
125, 126 (2d Cir. 1940) (concurring opinion).
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difficulty in applying this test of finality.1 Since the Rules failed to define a
"claim," two different theories arose to determine whether an order actually
disposed of a separate claim.' The "pragmatic" approach focused on the
factual situations presented to define a claim,' 3 whereas the "cause of action"
approach looked to the legal theories of the case.'- Under the first definition,
a separate set of facts constituted a claim which had to be appealed as one
unit;15 and under the latter view, separate and distinct claims which were
separately appealable could arise out of the same set of facts.1 Even if a
litigant knew which theory the court would apply, however, neither approach
defined its own criteria with sufficient precision to enable the litigant to
determine when he had a final and appealable claim.'-
The confusion among the courts after the Reeves case placed litigants in
a dilemma. Should they seek review they might be dismissed for lack of
finality after having prepared their case on the merits. Yet once a judgment
was entered on an appealable claim, time for taking an appeal began to run.18
Thus, an inaccurate guess as to appealability might result in a denial of the
right to review on that claim.' 9 To protect themselves against such an
eventuality, litigants were forced to take precautionary appeals, which might
prove fruitless and unnecessary.2 0
To eliminate the confusion about when appeal could be taken, Rule 54(b)
was amended, effective in 1948. All criteria defining the scope of a final
11. Compare Wright v. Gibson, 128 F2d S65 (9th Cir. 1942), uith Hanney v. Frank-
lin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F.2d S64 (9th Cir. 1944); and Collins v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939), with Clark v. Taylor, 163 F2d 940
(2d Cir. 1947). See Comments, 47 CoL. L. Ruv. 239 (1947); 47 Micn. L R,. 233
(1948).
12. See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 141, 143 (1946).
13. E.g., Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F2d 32 , 329 (2d Cir.
1947); Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 136 F2d 621 (2d Cir. 1943); Original
Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theatre, 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943).
14. E.g., Zaratti S.S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F.2d 377 (Qd Cir. 1946); Hanney
v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1944); Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 942 (2d Cir. 1947); Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum
Heat & Power Co., 162 F.2d 327, 329 (2d Cir. 1947).
16. Hanney v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 142 F2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944).
See Clark v. Taylor, 163 F.2d 940, 949 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion).
17. "[D]ecisions as to the extent of a 'claim' or a 'cause of action' or a 'transaction'
must necessarily be directed to the facts in issue in a particular case and cannot be safely
generalized into rigid rules applicable to other factual situations... ." Judge Clark in
Collins v. 'Metro Goldwvyn Pictures Corp., 106 F2d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1939) (concurring
opinion). See Note, 56 YALE UJ. 141, 145 (1946).
18. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 338 U.S. S07 (1950).
19. Ibid.
20. ADvISORY Co. iiiTTa's NOTE To FaD. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 23 U.S.C., following
§ 723c (1946); 'MoouR, Co~MMNTARY oN TH U.S. JUmCLL Corz 514-15 (1949); Com-
ment, 47 MicH. L. REv. 233, 237 (1948) ; Note, 56 YALE L.J. 141, 148 (1946).
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judgment were deleted. Instead, the Rule now provides that a trial judge may
enter a final judgment disposing of "one or more but less than all" of the
claims in a multiple claims suit upon "an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment."2'
Without these specific findings, time for appealing such claims does not run.
And no order 22 separately disposing of a claim is appealable without such
findings, even though a similar order would have been heard under the old
Rule.23 By this device it was hoped that a simple, definite, and workable
test of finality had been established which would both reduce the number of
appeals from multiple claims suits and protect litigants from inadvertently
losing their right of appeal. At the same time the discretion given the trial
judge would permit appeal in the infrequent hardship case.
2 4
Where an order separately disposes of at least one of the claims in a
multiple claims suit, the need for precautionary appeals has been eliminated,
because Rule 54(b) specifically provides that such an order is not final without
the determination of the trial judge. But the possibility remains that where
a litigant has taken an appeal on the basis of the trial judge's determination,
he may still be dismissed by the appellate court for lack of finality. Two
interpretations of the new 54(b) have been advanced. In Flegenhcier v.
21. In its present amended form, Rule 54(b) reads as follows: "When more than
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one
or more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination that there Is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination. and direction, any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as
to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims." Fi. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
22. Interlocutory orders appealable by statute, see note 1 supra, are not included
under Rule 54(b). Cutting Room Appliance Corp. v. Empire Cutting Mach. Co,, 186
F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1951); MOORE, FEDERAL RULEs PAMpHLET 252 (1951). Contra: Pack-
ard Motor Car Co. v. Gem Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1951).
But judicial exception to the final decision rule, see note 36 infra, may in some
instances come under 54(b). For discussion of the applicability of 54(b) to such situa-
tions, see MooRE, FEDERAL RuLEs PAmiPHLT 253-6 (1951).
Whether a case actually involves multiple claims so as to come within the provisions
of 54(b) may also cause difficulty. See General Time Corp. v. Padua Alarm Systems,
Inc., 199 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1952).
23. Lyman v. Remington Rand, Inc., 188 F2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951); David v. District
of Columbia, 187 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1950). MOORE, ComMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUrDCIAL
CODE 516 (1949).
24. ADvisoRY Comtri=2's NOTE To FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) 28 U.S.C., following §
723c (1946). It has been asserted that mandamus will be available in cases of flagrant
abuse of discretion by the trial judge in refusing to make a determination. Mooan, Com-
MENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 518 (1949). Cf. Winsor v. Daumit, 179 F.2d 475,
478 (7th Cir. 1950).
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General Aills, 2 5 the Second Circuit held that the determination of the trial
judge could not make final and appealable an order which would not have
been final prior to the amendment.2 0 Accordingly, that court would still have
to determine its own jurisdiction on appeal by the same confusing tests of
finality that had plagued litigants under original 54(b). On the other hand,
in Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass,27 the Third Circuit, sitting cn banc,2 3
held that the trial judge's determination made appealable an order dismissing
a claim without disposing of a compulsory counterclaim-an order which
clearly would not have been appealable under the original Rule. So in that
circuit, whenever an order separately disposes of either a claim or counter-
claim, the litigant, having secured the determination of the trial judge, is
assured of having his appeal heard on the merits.
The rationale of the Flegenheivwr approach, as extended by two dissent-
ing judges in Bendix,29 is that to allow appeals now which would not have
been heard prior to the amendment would change the established meaning of
25. 191 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1951), 65 HAnv. I REV. 1245 (1952), 35 ' Mnni. I Rnv.
403 (1952). Originally, action in contract had been brought against defendant Canadian
corporation, plaintiff Flegenheimer attaching property which he asserted belonged to
defendant. General Mills then had been allowed to intervene and set up a claim of
ownership to the goods attached. And upon dismissal of its claim, General Mills had
sought to appeal; but the dismissal had been held to be interlocutory because no e.xpress
determination had been made under 54(b). Flegenheimer v. Manitoba Sugar Ltd., 178
F2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950). After appellant had secured the proper determination, Judge
Learned Hand held, in the instant case, that the order would still not ba reviewed
because historically such an order was not final. It is questionable, however, whether the
order would not have been appealable under original 54(b). See Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-
Ur-Self Systems, 194 F2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion).
26. The Second Circuit is sharply split on this problem. Compare Judge Frank's
view in Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F2d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied sub nor. Coston Supply Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U.S. 893 (1951), uitth Judge
Clark's view in Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, 194 F2d 42, 424 (2d Cir. 1951)
(concurring opinion).
27. 195 F2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952), 65 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1245. The action was one for
specific performance on an employment contract. It asked that defendant be required
to execute a patent application on defendant's invention to which plaintiff was entitled
by terms of the contract, and that the defendant be restrained from dealing vith the
invention as his own. Defendant counterclaimed, asserting that the assignment of his
invention to plaintiff was made under circumstances entitling him to compeansation. There-
after the defendant moved for dismissal of the original complaint on the ground that,
since the institution of the suit, he had complied with the contract and filed the patent
application in the form requested by plaintiff. The motion vwas granted with the trial
judge making the determination required by Rule 54(b).
28. An original hearing held the order non-appealable. See 20 US.. \VE=o. 2106 (3d
Cir. Sept. 6, 1951), 100 U. oF PA. L. REv. 451. This opinion was withdrawn and a re-
hearing held en bane.
29. While Judges Hastie and Kalodner argued that the order could be heard under §
1292, see note 1 sirpra, as an order denying an injunction; they felt it should not ba heard
under Rule 54(b) following the Flegehcliher doctrine. Thus, although their opinion is
actually a concurrence, it is referred to throughout this note as a dissent.
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"final decision." This would materially alter the jurisdiction of the courts
of appeals-a result beyond the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.8°
Furthermore, fear is expressed that the Bendix holding would contravene
the historic policy against interlocutory appeals 3l-a policy based on the con-
servation of judicial energy 32 and the avoidance of unnecessary delay and
cost to litigants.3 3 In the view of the Bendix minority, appeals should en-
compass a sufficient quantum of litigation to forestall multiple review of the
same facts. Such was the rule prior to the Reeves case, they argue; that case
merely crystallized the "separate transaction" as the proper unit for judicial
review.3 4 Since a claim and compulsory counterclaim, as in Bendix, patently
involve overlapping facts, only an order disposing of both claims can be
considered final.
Judicial history casts doubt on the immutability of "final decision." Origin-
ally, a final decision required the termination of the entire litigation85 Yet not
only were judicial exceptions created before the Federal Rules, 0 but original
54(b), as interpreted in the Reeves case, itself changed prior concepts of final-
30. "[T]he act of June 19, 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U.S.C. 723b, authorizing this court
to prescribe rules of procedure in civil actions gave it no authority to modify, abridge
or enlarge substantive rights of litigants or to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." Mr. Justice Stone in United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590
(1941).
31. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 1952) (concurring
opinion). See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). Crick, The Filial
Judgment as a Basis of Appeal, 41 YA.E L.J. 539, 551 (1932), points out that early
decisions merely asserted the rule without giving any justification for it. As the business
of the courts increased at a rapid rate, the final decision rule proved a ready made device
for discouraging excessive appeals and came to be justified in these terms.
In the New York state courts, appeals may be taken as of right from almost all
interlocutory orders. N.Y. Civ. PRac. Acr § 609. Judge Clark believes this may account
for the fact that so many final decision cases arise in the Second Circuit. Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895, 907 n.5 (2d Cir. 1943) (dissenting opinion). This state practice
may result in a preference by litigants for the federal courts. Harper, Civil Practice inl
the Federal Courts 81, in PRAcrsING LAW INSTITUTE, TRIAL PAMCTCE (1946).
32. "[M]any mistakes, apparently important at the time, will be seen to be trivial
from the perspective of a final disposition of the case. . . ." Perkins v. Endicott Johnson
Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). See also Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945).
33. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) ; Forgay v. Conrad, 6
How. 201, 205 (U.S. 1848) ; Canter v. American Ins. Co., 3 Pet. 307, 318 (U.S. 1830).
34. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 278-80 (3d Cir. 1952) (concurring
opinion). See note 37 infra.
35. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920); Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How.
552, 554 (U.S. 1857); United States v. Girault, 20 How. 21, 32 (U.S. 1850).
36. Three classes of judicial exception to the final decision rule have evolved:
(1) The rule in Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201 (U.S. 1848) (decree disposing of
property which the successful party was entitled to have carried into execution im-
mediately is final, although the judgment also provided for an accounting). See Radio
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ity.37 Nor was the policy against piecemeal review applied as strictly, prior
to the Federal Rules, as the Bendix minority imply. Since Be;ndix involved
an equitable claim for specific performance and a legal counterclaim for
damages, plaintiff could have objected to interposition of the counterclaim.
In such instance defendant would have been forced to bring his counter-
claim in an independent action, which would have been separately appealable.S
Moreover, even under original 54(b), orders disposing of cross-claims, inter-
venor's claims and third-party claims were separately appealable although
Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945); Thompson v. Dean, 7 Wall. 342 (U.S.
1869) ; Kasishke v. Baker, 144 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1944).
(2) The "offshoot" rule applying to collateral orders. See Trustees v. Greenough,
105 U.S. 527 (1881) (order directing costs to be paid out of a fund in the hands of the
court); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 6M4 (1950)
(order vacating an attachment in admiralty); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949) (order denying a corporation's motion that the plaintiff in a stor*i-
holder's derivative suit be required, pursuant to state statute, to give security for reason-
able expenses of the defendant in connection with the action).
(3) The separate order in multiple-party suits. See note 5 stpra.
In carving out exceptions to the final decision rule, courts have been careful to
point out that they are not making interlocutory orders appealable. Rather they assert
that the order in question is separable from or collateral to the rest of the litigation so
that the order in question is a final decision. Sec Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
37. There were several possibilities for joinder of claims arising out of different
transactions, even under pre-Federal Rules practice. Under common law pleadifig, wvhen
applicable in the federal courts, claims falling within the legal limits of a certain form
of action could be joined although based on widely separated groups of facts. CLAr, CoD;
PLEADING 436 (2d ed. 1947). Equity Rule 26, 226 U.S. 655 (1912), provided that a
plaintiff could join as many equitable causes of action against a defendant as he might
have. See DOBIp, FaDERAL PA tncr .,D PRocEoDTr 6S1-3 (1923). And under Equity
Rule 30, 226 U.S. 657 (1912), a defendant could set up in his answer any equitable
counterclaim he might have against the plaintiff although arising out of a different
transaction from the subject matter of the suit. See American Mills Co. v. American
Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360, 365 (1922) ; DoBm, supra. at 701-07. In none of these Fituations
was a decision disposing of less than all the claims by one party against another final and
appealable. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920) ; Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946
(2d Cir. 1912) ; Moopi, FEDERAL RuLES PAmPHLrr 247 (1951). But see Note, 49 YAmx
L.J. 1476, 1480 and n.25 (1940).
To the extent that Reeves v. Beardall extended the separate transaction test to cover
such situations, it changed prior decisional law. The Rhoer Rouge type of exception,
supra note 5, while based on a separate transaction, applied only where there were multiple
parties and not to cases where there was but a single defendant. Ex parte National
Enameling Co., 201 U.S. 156, 165 (1906); Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946, 943 (2d Cir.
1912); 'ooRE, FEDERAL RULES PAmPHLET 248 (1951).
38. There was no compulsory joinder of legal counterclaims in an equitable action
although both claims arose from a single transaction; otherwise the parties would ba de-
prived of their right to jury trial on the legal claim. American Mills Co. v. American
Surety Co. 260 U.S. 360. 364-5 (1922).
Similar rules applied to other situations. Legal claims could not be joined unless they
sounded within the same common law form of action. Philips & Colby Construction Co.
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arising out of the same set of facts as the principal claim and involving
multiple review.89
The view of the Bendix court that amended Rule 54(b) can and does
change the content of the final decision 40 thus seems historically acceptable.
41
But even if the Flegenheimer view of finality is rejected in favor of Bcndix,
the problem of defining a claim remains. Since Rule 54(b) expressly states
that an order must dispose of at least one claim, appellate courts appear
bound to dismiss any appeal which does not satisfy this requirement.42 In
practice, recent decisions have ignored the problem of whether or not an order
disposed of a claim. In Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lea & Fcbigcr,43
the First Circuit held that the trial judge's finding of finality made appealable
an order dismissing one of several defendants jointly liable. And in a similar
situation in Lopisky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems,44 a Second Circuit
v. Seymour, 91 U.S. 646, 654 (1875) ; Garland v. Davis, 4 How. 131 (U.S. 1846). Ex-
ceptions were made in allowing the joinder of debt and detinue, and trover and case. See
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 436 and n.4 (2d ed. 1947). And legal and equitable claims could
not be joined in a single suit. Scott v. Nealy, 140 U.S. 106, 111 (1891) ; Bniett v.
Butterworth, 11 How. 668, 708 (U.S. 1850).
39. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Petroleutn Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950) (intervenor's
claim); New Orleans Public Belt R.R. v. Wallace, 173 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1949)
(cross-claim); Brown v. Cranston, 132 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1942) (third-party claim),
40. The Bendix majority argued that procedural rules necessarily affect the number
and kinds of appeals going up to the appellate courts; and when such rules change, the
impact of the jurisdictional statute must also change. Cf. Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self
Systems, 194 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion). Moreover, the Bendix
majority point out that the negative effect of Rule 54(b) in prohibiting the appeal of an
order lacking the determination of the trial judge restricts jurisdiction as much as the
positive effect would expand it. But see Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190
F.2d 334, 338-9 (2d Cir. 1951).
41. The Bendix position is also taken by Professor Moore, who says, "The Rule does
not attempt to modify or supersede the appellate jursdictiohn statutes. Their broad out-
lines remain. Their content has alvays been supplied by judicial decisions, and if the
Supreme Court can by judicial decisions define finality within the meaning of those
statutes, as admittedly it has done and can do, then it has the power by rule, which has
the force of statute, to define finality for a limited situation-where an action involves
multiple claims." MooR, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDIcIAL CODE 516-17 (1949). For
Judge Frank's reply to this argument, see Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F2d 169, 178 (2d
Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied sub noin. Coston Supply Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U.S,
893 (1951).
42. See Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
Coston Supply Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
43. 195 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1952). Plaintiff brought an action for treble damages against
several defendants for conspiracy under the Clayton Act. The order dismissing one of
those defendants on jurisdictional grounds was held appealable.
44. 194 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1951). In 'rauzin v. Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.,
195 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952), appeal was dismissed for lack of finality in this situation.




panel, different from that in Flegenheinwr, permitted appeal. Regardless of
whether a "pragmatic" or "cause of action" theory of claim be employed, how-
ever, an order such as this does not dispose of even a single claim.A4 Although
the result reached seems desirable,40 the use of the trial judge's determination
to justify hearing such an appeal seems a misapplication of the Rule as now
written.
But appellate review of whether an order below disposed of a "claim"
within the meaning of 54(b) may easily lead to as much uncertainty and
confusion as does the problem of finality under Fkegcnh mcr. 47 The old
clash between the "cause of action" and "pragmatic" theories under the rule
may be perpetuated. 48 And the benefits of Bendix may then be limited
to the claim-counterclaim situation, where the "claim" problem does not arise.
The litigant, caught in a semantic jungle, may still have to prepare his brief
and argument on the merits with little idea whether or not he will be heard.
One means of eliminating present uncertainty as to whether an appellate
court will hear an appeal under 54(b) might be to make conclusive the de-
termination by the trial judge that there is an appealable clqim.9 Although
the Boston Medical and Lopinsky courts have in effect reached this result by
ignoring the issue of whether the order in question disposed of a claim, the
litigant now has no assurance of such treatment should the "claim" issue
actually be raised. Consequently, a change in the Rule or jurisdictional
45. Atwater v. North American Coal Corp., 111 F2d 125, 126 (2d Cir. 1940) (con-
curring opinion) ("pragmatic!' theory) ; Zarati S.S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F.2d
377, 379 (2d Cir. 1946) ("cause of action" theory). See Hunteman v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., 119 F2d 465 (5th Cir. 1941). And see Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 2,33, 286
(1942).
46. For example, if an order wrongfully dismissing the only solvent defendant of
several jointly liable is not immediately appealable, the plaintiff may have to stand the
burden of a long and costly trial resulting in a worthless verdict before being able to
obtain redress. See Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F.2d 169, 179 (2d Cir.) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied sub norw. Coston Supply Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U. S. S93 (1951) ;
Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 626 n.3 (2d Cir. 1943) (concurring
opinion).
47. Other difficulties may arise under present 54(b) in distinguishing btween
counterclaims and defenses. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial
Corp., 154 F2d 814 (2d Cir.), cert. de fed, 328 U.S. 859 (1946) ; CLa=, Corn PLADNwu
640-1 (2d ed. 1947). For a discussion of existing confusion as to whether liability is
"joint," see Comment, 47 CoL. L. RE%. 239, 249 (1947).
48. See page 265 supra.
49. Whenever all the issues as against all the parties have been decided, appeal
of right without the trial judge's determination would obtain, as now, under § 1291. See
note 1 supra. Any other decision would require the determination of the trial judge
as is now required under Rule 54(b). A possible exception might be made for inter-
locutory orders now appealable by statute and by judicial exception to the final decision
rule, based on the possibility of irreparable harm. See note 22 sittra. In all other cases,
discretion should rest with the trial judge.
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statutes " seems desirable in order to eliminate the Flegenheimer approach
and to remove the real possibility of Boston Medical and Lopinsky being treated
as abusive of present 54(b). Furthermore, such a provision might also require
the trial judge to find that no further litigation would be necessary for the
judgment to become effective.r' If the latter finding were left subject to review,
appellate courts could preserve the policy against interlocutory appeals 2 -a
policy which, although raising problems similar to those under 54(b), has
been excluded from the scope of this Note.
Statutory or rule changes along the lines suggested might provide a work-
able device for allowing appeals without interference from abstract jurisdic-
tional fetters.53 Once the trial judge, familiar with the facts, had determined
that an appeal could and should be heard,5 4 the litigant would be assured of
having his case heard on the merits with a minimum of cost and delay. The
success of such a proposal would depend upon the wise exercise of discretion
by the trial judge. Although excessive appeals might be permitted, the poten-
tial advantages of the scheme warrant its trial. Should the result be in fact
to overburden the appellate courts, an alternative arrangement might be sub-
stituted to give the courts of appeals discretion to deny review even where the
trial judge had determined that an appeal should be heard. But, in that
situation, provision should be made for the appellate court to determine all
jurisdictional questions prior to the preparation of the case on the merits.0
50. Although the adoption of such a rule would seem within the rule-making power
of the Supreme Court, a statutory enactment would resolve all the doubts which have
plagued interpreters of Rule 54(b).
51. Cf. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
52. There have been proposals recently for permitting interlocutory orders to be
heard. Judge Frank would give the courts of appeals power to hear such appeals at
their discretion, upon the motion of aggrieved litigants. See Pabellon v. Grace Line,
191 F.2d 169, 176 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. denied Mnb nora. Coston Supply
Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U.S. 893 (1951). See also Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1186, 1189 (1949).
Professor Moore would allow the district judges to certify interlocutory questions,
which the appellate courts might hear at their discretion. Moore & Vestal, Present and
Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REv. 1, 7, 45
(1949).
53. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis of Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 558 (1932),
speaks of the final decision rule as "a labor saving device which causes more labor than
it saves," because of the difficulty in determining what constitutes a final decision.
Cf. Pabellon v. Grace Line, 191 F2d 169, 179 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied sub nora. Coston Supply Co. v. Pabellon, 342 U.S. 893 (1951).
54. Cf. Judge Clark in Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, 194 F.2d 422, 429
(2d Cir. 1951) (concurring opinion).
55. Litigants might prepare short petitions asking for review, provided the trial judge
had determined that appeal might be taken. Like petitions for certiorari, these would then
be granted or denied before the appeal is heard. Should unreasonable denial by the trial
judge of the right to seek such review become a major problem, the appellate courts might
be allowed full discretion to hear appeals merely on the motion of the litigants. See note
52 mtpra.
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